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Abstract: Green technology innovation is regarded as an important means to achieve sustainable
development. Countries all over the world mainly implement green technology innovation policies
from the aspects of environmental regulation and financing constraints. The effect of financing
constraint policy on enterprise green technology innovation remains to be investigated. Based on
the event of “green credit guidelines” issued by China Banking Regulatory Commission in 2012,
this paper collects the panel data of China’s 2825 listed companies from 2007 to 2018, constructs
a difference-in-difference model, and studies the impact of green credit guidelines on corporate
green technology innovation and its mechanism. The empirical results show: First, green credit
guidelines can promote corporate green technology innovation on the whole. Second, the mechanism
of green credit on enterprise green technology innovation is identified. Green credit guidelines
mainly limited green technology innovation through reducing debt financing, rather than through
financing constraints. Third, the impact of green credit guidelines on green technology innovation is
heterogeneous. Green credit guidelines have a significant effect on the green technology innovation
of state-owned and large enterprises, but have no effect on the green technology innovation of
non-state-owned and small ones.
Keywords: green credit guidelines; corporate green technology innovation; heterogeneity
1. Introduction
Green technology innovation is considered as an important means to achieve sustain-
able development. Although technological innovation has solved many problems faced
by human beings, it has not effectively solved the problem of carbon emissions caused by
human activities and global temperature rise, which also seriously restricts the sustainable
development. Green technology innovation can reduce the cost of emission reduction by
using better technology [1] and thus can reduce waste, reduce pollution, improve ecology,
promote the construction of ecological civilization, and realize sustainable development [2].
As one of the main carbon emission entities, corporate motivation towards green innova-
tion technology plays a key role in global sustainable development. In order to maximize
their own economic benefits and achieve some social goals, various countries formulate
different policies to guide or urge corporates to achieve energy conservation and emission
reduction by improving the resource efficiency. Through the guidance of green techno-
logical innovation policy, corporates can improve their resource efficiency and achieve
win–win development of social energy conservation and emission reduction [3,4].
The government generally implements green technology innovation policy from
two aspects, namely environmental regulation and financing restriction. As for environ-
mental regulation policy, there is no consistent conclusion. On the one hand, environmental
regulation can stimulate corporate innovation to reduce the production costs and improve
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the quality of products. Porter and Vanderlinde [3] and Porter [5] believe that well-designed
environmental regulation can stimulate corporate technological innovation, which is usu-
ally called the “weak Porter Hypothesis”. Scholars mainly use pollution abatement and
control expenditures (PACE) to measure the degree of environmental regulation. In differ-
ent countries (or regions), the role of environmental regulation is not alike [6]. Jaffe and
Palmer [7] and Brunnermeier and Cohen [8] are the first to carry out empirical research
in this field. They use the data of the American manufacturing industry to confirm that
environmental regulation can promote corporate innovation to a certain extent. Ambec and
Barla [9] believe that environmental regulation can encourage firms to adopt innovative
behaviors that bring profit growth.Hamamoto [10] concluded that environmental regula-
tion played a positive role in R&D expenditure of the Japanese manufacturing industry.
Yang et al. [11] used the industry panel data of Taiwan, they also found that the degree
of environmental regulation is positively correlated with the level of R&D investment.
Rubashkina et al. [12] used the enterprise data of major European countries and found
that environmental regulation has a significant role in promoting their innovation. In ad-
dition, other indicators are also used to measure the degree of environmental regulation.
For example, Chakraborty and Chatterjee [13] studied the impact of Germany’s regulatory
policy of banning “azo” dyes on upstream leather and textile firms in India, and found
that environmental regulation promoted India’s innovation. Other scholars have also
studied environmental technological innovation, for example, Horbach [14] found that
environmental regulation, environmental management tools, and general organizational
change can encourage corporate environmental innovation. Measuring environment regu-
lation by environmental protection tax, Costa-Campi et al. [15] used the data of Spanish
manufacturing industry to confirm the incentive effect of environmental regulation on
enterprise R&D investment.
On the other hand, environmental regulation may bring additional governance costs
to firms, which will reduce the resources available to corporates, thus reducing the level
of technological innovation [16]. Whaller and Whitehead [17] argued that environmental
regulation not only made corporates bear high costs, but also limited the flow of capital
from promising innovation projects to pollution reduction projects, thus reducing the
technological innovation ability of firms. Leonard [18] believed that compared with the
firms less affected by environmental regulation, firms that were more affected by envi-
ronmental regulation may lose their domestic and international market share. At the
same time, they will also face the increasing operation and investment costs caused by
strict environmental regulation. Therefore, they will tend to choose the regions with weak
regulation to rearrange production and investment and reduce the share of innovation
investment. Yuan and Xiang [19] used the data of Chinese manufacturing firms to draw
the conclusion that increasing pollution control costs inhibited the innovation output of
firms. Shi, et al. [20] estimated the impact of China’s carbon emissions trading pilot policy
on corporate innovation output and concluded that this policy significantly inhibited the
innovation of regulated and non-regulated firms. Kneller and Manderson [21] used the en-
vironmental protection expenditure to measure environmental regulation, and concluded
that environmental regulation was not helpful in increasing the R&D investment in the
British manufacturing industry, and explained that although environmental regulation in-
creases environmental R&D investment, it has a crowding out effect on non-environmental
R&D investment.
It is conductive to promote green technology innovation through financing constraints.
Countries all over the world have issued a series of financing policies to encourage green
technology innovation; for instance, in 1991, Poland established the environmental pro-
tection bank, which focuses on supporting investment projects to promote environmental
protection. In 1993, in order to further promote the development of energy-saving tech-
nology, Japan’s Ministry of General Production increased the total amount of financial
investment and loans related to energy and environment from 560 billion yen in 1992 to
970 billion yen. In 2012, the UK government invested 3 billion pounds to establish the first
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green investment bank, the UK Green Investment Bank, focusing on green infrastructure
projects with commercial value. China’s green finance policy started late. China Banking
Regulatory Commission issued the “green credit guidelines” in 2012 to guide the banking
financial institutions to issue green credit, and would evaluate on the effectiveness of
green credit in banking financial institutions. Differently from other green finance policies,
China’s green credit guidelines is a policy issued by the national banking supervision
department, which has a strong binding force.
There are many literatures on the policy effect evaluation of environmental regula-
tion, but the policy effect evaluation based on financing constraints is relatively scattered.
This paper studies the policy effect of financing constraints on green technology innovation.
The main work includes the following aspects: (1) studying the effectiveness of green credit
policy on green technology innovation. Green credit policy has a significant impact on
corporate financing, but there is no consistent conclusion on corporate green technology
innovation. This paper takes China’s “green credit guidelines” as a case to evaluate the
effect of green credit policy on enterprise green technology innovation. The reason for
choosing China’s green credit guidelines as a case is that China is an emerging market
country, and big economies are different from small ones. The evaluation of green credit
policy can not only examine the role of green credit on the enterprise development in a
specific stage, but also examine the heterogeneous effect of green credit policy. These re-
sults show that the introduction of green credit policy can significantly promote green
technology innovation. (2) This paper analyzes the mechanism of green credit on green
technology innovation. The results show that green credit policy mainly reduces green
technology innovation through the level of short-term debt and long-term debt financing,
rather than through financing constraints. (3) This paper analyzes the heterogeneous effect
of green credit policy on green technology innovation. To a certain extent, firms with
different attributes will have different motives for green technology innovation, so that
the impact of green credit guidelines on green technology innovation is heterogeneous.
Property right structure leads to managers’ decision-making differences on strategic green
technology innovation, and firm size determines its financing flexibility. To a much greater
extent, green credit affects firms’ financing costs and ways. Therefore, the heterogeneous
impact of green credit on firm’s green technology innovation is mainly reflected in the
property right structure and firm size. The empirical results confirm the existence of this
heterogeneity and show that green credit policy has a significant effect on state-owned and
large firms, but has no effect on non-state-owned firms and small and medium-sized firms.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 is the model design, variables
and data sources, and benchmark regression analysis results. Section 3 analyzes the
mechanism of green credit policy on green technology innovation. Section 4 further
discusses the heterogeneous impact of green credit policy on firms with different property
rights and firms with different sizes. Section 5 briefly describes limitations of the study.
Finally, Section 6 concludes and puts forward relevant policy suggestions.
2. Econometric Test on Whether Green Credit Guidelines Affect Green
Technology Innovation
2.1. Model Design
The impact of green credit policy on corporate green technology innovation is mainly
realized through policy incentives. Specifically, firstly, green credit policy will attract public
attention to green products, making firms have to face the supervision of the public, pay at-
tention to their own social responsibility, and consciously improve their green technology
innovation. Second, according to the “innovation compensation effect” in the Porter hy-
pothesis, when faced with the green credit policy, in order to obtain more credit support
or better loan interest rate, firms often improve environmental governance technology,
promote cleaner production, or increase environmental governance to control environmen-
tal risks [10,22]. Finally, green credit policy can effectively reduce the uncertainty in the
process of corporate R&D investment and then reduce the risk.
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The higher level of green credit will encourage firms to consciously improve envi-
ronmental governance technology and improve the level of green technology innovation;
in contrast, with higher level of green technology innovation, it is easier for firms to obtain
green credit funds from banks. Then, we can find that firms with a higher level of green
credit will produce higher level of green technology innovation. In this way, there is mutual
causality between the explanatory variable and the explained variable, which will make the
explanatory variable related to the error term, leading to endogenous problems and thus
inconsistent estimation of parameters [23]. When the policy is exogenous, the difference-
in-difference method can effectively alleviate the endogenous problems [24]. Moreover,
the difference-in-difference method can not only control the unobservable individual het-
erogeneity between samples, but also control the influence of unobservable time-varying
population factors, so we can obtain the consistent estimator of policy effect. With these
good properties, the difference-in-difference method has been widely used in the field of
policy evaluation. Based on this, we use the event of “green credit guidelines” issued by
China Banking Regulatory Commission on 24 February 2012 (before the promulgation of
the “green credit guidelines” in 2012, the credit policies in banking financial institutions
paid less attention to green development issues; while the “green credit guidelines” issued
in 2012 required banking financial institutions to clarify the direction and key areas of green
credit support, to formulate special credit guidelines for industries with major environ-
mental and social risks and those are restricted by national regulation, and to implement
differential and dynamic credit policy), and establish a difference-in-difference model to
evaluate the impact of green credit guidelines on green technology innovation. The specific
model is as follows:
Greeninnovation = β0 + β1Post + β2Treatment firms + β3Post× Treatment firms + βjControlsj + Firmdum
+ Yeardum + ε
(1)
Among them, Greeninnovation refers to the number of green invention patent appli-
cations of enterprises (divided by the number of invention patent applications), Post is the
event dummy variable, when the year is in 2012, otherwise the value is 0; Treatment firms
is the group variable, whose value is 1 when firm is in treatment group, otherwise the
value is 0 (as the enterprises in heavy pollution industries are directly affected by the
green credit guidelines, they are treated as treatment group and non-heavy pollution
industries as control group). Controlsj includes a series of firm-level control variables.
β3 is the coefficient on the interaction term, which measures the impact of green credit
guidelines on green technology innovation. This paper also adds to variable Firmdum
and Yeardum to capture the effects of not time-varying firm-level factors and time-related
factors. Additionally, we also consider constructing the model with absorptive capacity
included, because the absorptive capacity can affect the adoption process and the cost of
green technology innovation [25]. Scholars usually use the number of patents [26] or R&D
personnel [27] to measure absorptive capacity. Therefore, in order to ensure the robustness
of the results, we also add the number of patents as the measure of absorptive capacity in
the model, and the results are still valid (see Table A1 in the Appendix A). The coefficient
of the interaction term is still significantly positive, indicating that green credit guidelines
can promote corporate green technology innovation.
According to the theory of technology innovation, we select five main control variables:
(1) Firm size. According to Schumpeter’s hypothesis, the larger the firms are, the more
efficient technological innovation will be. In other words, large firms are more innovative
than small firms [28]. (2) The nature of firms’ property rights. Scholars usually think that
state-owned enterprises are faced with soft budget constraints, which is not conducive to
technological innovation. For example, Hart et al. [29] and Shleifer [30] demonstrated that
when the ownership is owned by the government, managers usually have no incentive to
invest in innovation to reduce costs and improve quality. Therefore, private ownership is
usually superior to government ownership when innovation incentive and cost reduction
are needed. Qian and Xu [31] analyzed the hindering effect of bureaucracy on innovation
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in a centralized economy under a soft budget constraint framework. (3) Firm’s ownership
structure. The relationship between ownership concentration and technological innovation
is still controversial. On the one hand, some scholars believe that improving owner-
ship concentration may be conducive to technological innovation. According to Shleifer
and Vishny [32], the increase of shareholding ratio will make the majority shareholders
strengthen the supervision of opportunistic behavior of managers, which can improve
firms’ technological innovation. On the other hand, some scholars believe that the improve-
ment of ownership concentration hinders technological innovation. Demsetz and Lehn [33]
believe that when the shareholding ratio is high enough, majority shareholders are able
to expropriate the minority shareholders by colluding with managers and controlling the
company’s decisions, so as to reduce firms’ technological innovation, which is generally
known as the “expropriation effect” of majority shareholders. (4) Shareholding ratio of
institutional investors. Generally speaking, greater institutional ownership is associated
with more innovation. According to the research of Aghion et al. [34], when institutional
investors hold a high proportion of shares, managers will pay attention to improving the
level of technological innovation in order to reduce personal occupational risk. (5) Firm’s
profitability. R&D projects have the characteristics of long duration and uncertain income,
which makes it difficult for firms to attract external investment in R&D projects [35,36].
Firms need to have certain financial resources and ability to support R&D projects, so prof-
itability is very important to support R&D innovation [37]. Audretsch [38] found that firm’s
profitability usually affects their innovation activities, and firms with higher profitability
are more willing to carry out technological innovation.
2.2. Variables and Data
The dependent variable is the level of green innovation, which is indicated by the
number of green invention patents applications divided by the number of invention patent
applications. The independent variable is group dummy variable, event dummy variable,
and the interaction between them; the control variables include (1) firm size, which is
indicated by the natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of the year. Scholars
usually use the indicator “total assets” or “the number of employees” to measure the
firm size. Scherer (1965) argues that both indicators can be used to measure firm size,
and when “the number of employees” is used as the measurement indicator for firm
size, the results can better support Schumpeter hypothesis, while when “total assets”
is used, the results cannot support the hypothesis. However, in China, manufacturing
enterprises account for the vast majority of the total listed enterprises, which makes it
more appropriate to use total assets to measure the firm size. (2) Institutional investors
hold shares. Institutional investors are represented by the proportion of the shares held by
institutional investors; (3) State ownership. (4) Profitability is calculated by dividing the
net profit by the average balance of assets in the year. (5) The top ten shareholders (top-
ten holders): the top ten shareholders are indicated by the proportion of a shares held by the
top ten shareholders. Either the variable “the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder”
or “the top ten shareholders” is used to measure the ownership structure. As the variable
“the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder” has not passed the significance test,
we analyze the effect of “the shareholding ratio of the top ten shareholders” instead.
Furthermore, some scholars also examined the impact of corporate governance on green
innovation, such as the proportion of independent directors and the number of directors.
However, none of these variables have passed the significance test, so these variables are
not reported in the table. The mediating variables include: (1) the level of short-term debt
(ST debt), indicated by the current debt balance at the end of the year; (2) the level of
long-term debt (LT debt), indicated by non-current debt balance at the end of the year;
(3) the level of financing debt (FI debt), indicated by the interest bearing debt financing
balance at the end of the year; (4) the level of financing constraints (FC): according to the
method of Kaplan and Zingales [39], the KZ financing constraint index is synthesized by the
company’s operating net cash flow, dividends, cash holdings, asset liability ratio, Tobin’s Q
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and other financial indicators. This method has been widely used in the measurement of
financing constraint indicators [40]. Specifically, we construct the KZ index by following
these steps: first, we select the basic indexes to synthetic KZ indicators. These basic
indexes include operating net cash flow divided by total assets in the previous period,
cash dividends divided by total assets in the previous period, cash holdings divided by
total assets in the previous period, asset liability ratio, and Tobin’s Q. Then the weight needs
to be determined. We mainly classify the whole sample according to whether these basic
indexes are lower than the median. If they are lower than the median, kz1, kz2, kz3, kz4,
and kz5 are taken as 1, otherwise 0, KZ index is calculated: KZ = kz1 + kz2 + kz3 + kz4 + kz5.
Ordered logistic regression is used to estimate the weight of the indicators. The coefficients
of the parameters are the weight. Finally, we can synthesize the KZ financing constraint
index. The larger the value is, the higher the degree of financing constraints faced by
listed companies.
We mainly selected the data of Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2018. Since the
Ministry of Finance revised the accounting standards for business enterprises in February
2006, the financial data before 2007 is different from that in and after 2007. Meanwhile,
considering the availability of green invention patent data, we mainly choose the data
from 2007 to 2018. There are four sources of data: first, the number of green invention
patent applications mainly comes from the website of the State Intellectual Property Office
(http://pss-system.cnipa.gov.cn/sipopublicsearch/portal/uiIndex.shtml, accessed on 12
January 2021). We mainly identified the green patent based on the International Patent
Classification in the “green list of International Patent Classification” launched by the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 2010 (https://www.wipo.int/classifications/
ipc/green-inventory/home, accessed on 12 January 2021). Specifically, we collected the
data in two steps. First, we retrieved the patents by the keywords of specific corporate name
and year. Then we identified and counted the green patents according to the International
Patent Classification. Second, invention patent applications come from China Royal Flush
financial database. Third, the financial data such as bank loan balance, long-term loan
balance, total assets at the end of the year, asset–net interest ratio, top-ten shareholding
ratio, and the equity nature are mainly from China Security Market and Accounting
Research (CSMAR) database; fourth, the indicators such as the shareholding ratio of state-
owned equity and the shareholding ratio of institutional investors are mainly from China
RESSET database.
We mainly divide the heavy pollution industry and non-heavy pollution industry in
two steps: First, according to the relevant provisions of “the 12th Five Year Plan for air
pollution control in key areas” approved by the State Council of China, special emission
limits of air pollutants shall be implemented in six major industries including thermal
power, steel, petrochemical, cement, nonferrous metals, chemical industry, and coal-fired
boiler projects in key control areas. Therefore, the enterprises in the six major industries of
thermal power, iron and steel, petrochemical, cement, nonferrous metals, and chemical in-
dustry are preliminarily identified as heavy pollution industries. Second, according to “the
classification management name of environmental inspection industry in listed companies”
issued by the Ministry of environmental protection of China in 2008 and “the industry
classification guidance of listed companies” revised by China’s Securities Regulatory Com-
mission in 2012, we define 15 industries as the heavy pollution industries corresponding to
the above six industries. These industries include the pharmaceutical manufacturing indus-
try; non-metallic mineral products industry; wine, beverage, and refined tea manufacturing
industry; power and heat production and supply industry; petroleum processing industry;
coking and nuclear fuel processing industry; non-ferrous metal smelting and calendaring
industry; chemical raw materials and chemical products manufacturing industry; rubber
and plastic products industry; chemical fiber manufacturing industry; gas production and
supply industry; ferrous metal mining and dressing industry; nonferrous metal mining and
dressing industry; paper making and paper products industry; coal mining and washing
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industry; and ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing industry, while other industries
are defined as non-heavy pollution industries.
Specifically, the definition of main variables, measurement indicators, and data sources
are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Main variables, measurement indicators, and data sources.
Variable Meaning Measurement Index Data Sources
Green
innovation
The proportion of green
invent patent applications
Number of green patents divided by
number of patents
Website of State Intellectual
Property Office
Treatment Group dummy variable 1 for heavy polluting enterprises and0 for non-heavy polluting enterprises Assignment by industry
Post Event dummy variable 0 from 2007 to 2011 and 1 from 2012to 2018 Direct assignment
Size The size of the corporate The natural logarithm of the totalassets at the end of the year CSMAR
State
ownership State ownership Proportion of state-owned shares RESSET
Institutional Investors Institutional Investors Shareholding ratio ofinstitutional investors CSMAR
Profitability Profitability Net profit divided by average balanceof assets in the year CSMAR
Top-ten
holders
The proportion of the top-ten
shareholders
Shareholding ratio of top ten
shareholders CSMAR
ST debt Short-term debt Balance of current liabilities at theend of the year CSMAR
LT debt Long-term debt Balance of non-current liabilities atthe end of the year CSMAR
FI debt Financing liabilities Balance of financing liabilities at theend of the year CSMAR
FC Financial constraints KZ index Calculated
On the basis of the original data, data cleaning is carried out: First, considering the
great differences among financial enterprises, ST enterprises (Special Treat enterprises)
with general enterprises; these two types of enterprises are eliminated in the sample.
The reasons are as follows: There are great differences between the accounting system for
financial enterprises and the accounting standards for business enterprises, so the financial
indicators are not comparable between financial enterprises and business enterprises.
Additionally, the financial situation of ST enterprises is abnormal, which makes them
significantly different from ordinary enterprises. Second, the samples with lots of missing
values are deleted. Third, the samples with unreasonable data are deleted, such as the
samples with Institutional Investors is larger than 1 (it is impossible for the shareholding
ratio to be over 1). Table 2 presents summary statistics for the full sample.
Table 2. Summary statistics.
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Year 22,823 2013 3.390 2007 2018
Green innovation 22,823 0.0431 0.166 0 1
Largest holder 22,823 35.34 15.00 0.290 89.99
Top-ten holders 22,823 58.17 15.50 1.320 100.0
Institutional investors 22,823 0.271 0.246 0 0.996
State ownership 22,823 6.492 15.79 0 92.19
Size 22,823 21.92 1.329 10.84 28.52
Profitability 22,823 1.102 155.7 −51.95 23,510
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the main variables. It can be seen that,
on average, corporate green invention patents accounts for 4.31% of the total invention
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patents, indicating that green innovation has occupied a certain proportion of all the
innovation, though still not high. However, the standard deviation is 0.166, which is
larger than the average, indicating that most of the green invention patents come from
a few high patent intensive corporates. In addition, it can be seen that, on average,
the top ten shareholders hold 58.17% of the shares, which indicates that the ownership
concentration of China’s listed companies is relatively high; the proportion of state-owned
shares reaches 6.49%, and the standard deviation of the proportion of state-owned shares
is 15.79, which is larger than the average. This may be due to the fact that state-owned
shares are mainly concentrated in a few state-owned enterprises, and the proportion of
state-owned shares in non-state-owned corporates is relatively low.
2.3. Empirical Analysis
It has been explained that the nature of industry, the nature of property rights, firm size,
ownership concentration, the shareholding ratio of institutional investors and profitability
may affect green innovation. According to these characteristics, we group enterprises
into sub-samples. Specifically, firm size, ownership concentration, institutional investors’
shareholding ratio, and profitability are classified according to tri-sectional quantiles,
which can be divided into large-sized enterprises, medium-sized enterprises, and small-
sized enterprises. According to the nature of property rights, the samples can be divided
into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises. According to the nature of
the industry, they are divided into treatment group and control group. Finally, we calculate
out the statistics of green innovation for these sub-samples, which are shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Summary statistics of green innovation for the subsamples.
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Treatment group 8720 0.0442 0.169 0 1
Control group 14,103 0.0424 0.165 0 1
State-owned 9640 0.0404 0.158 0 1
Non-state-owned 13,183 0.0450 0.172 0 1
Large size 7609 0.360 0.272 0 0.993
Medium size 7605 0.255 0.227 0 0.996
Small size 7609 0.197 0.205 0 0.990
High institutional investors 7608 0.049 0.172 0 1
Medium institutional investors 7607 0.047 0.177 0 1
Low institutional investors 7608 0.033 0.148 0 1
High Top-ten holders 7608 0.042 0.168 0 1
Medium Top-ten holders 7606 0.047 0.172 0 1
Low Top-ten holders 7609 0.040 0.160 0 1
High profitability 7609 0.049 0.180 0 1
Medium profitability 7607 0.043 0.166 0 1
Low profitability 7607 0.037 0.152 0 1
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of green innovation for the subsamples. Com-
pared with the control group, note that green innovation in the treatment group is slightly
higher than that in the control group. There appears to be significant green innova-
tion differences among the enterprises with different size: The larger the enterprises are,
the more green innovation they produce. The level of green innovation for large enter-
prises, medium enterprises, and small enterprises is 0.360, 0.255, and 0.197, respectively.
In addition, there are differences in green innovation between state-owned enterprises
and non-state-owned enterprises, and non-state-owned enterprises produce more green
innovation than state-owned enterprises. Finally, it is worth noting whether there exist
differences in green innovation among enterprises with different a shareholding proportion
of institutional investors and enterprises with different profitability. These results show
that enterprises with more institutional investors and higher profitability tend to produce
more green innovation. Therefore, we can conclude that there may be heterogeneity in
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green innovation for enterprises with different size, property nature, institutional investor
shareholding ratio, and profitability.
Before regression analysis, it is necessary to test the correlation coefficient of the main
variables to identify whether there is serious multicollinearity between the explanatory
variables. Table 4 shows the results of Pearson correlation coefficient matrix.
Table 4. Correlation coefficient test results of main variables.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) Green Innovation 1
(2) Top-ten Holders 0.015 ** 1
(3) State Ownership −0.033 *** 0.158 *** 1
(4) Institutional Investors 0.035 *** 0.255 *** 0.006 1
(5) Size 0.082 *** 0.119 *** 0.098 *** 0.308 *** 1
(6) Profitability −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.007 −0.056 *** 1
Note: ** and *** indicate significance at the levels of 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Table 4 shows that green innovation is significantly correlated with top-ten holders,
institutional investors and size. Among them, top-ten holders, institutional investors and
size are positively correlated with green innovation, while state ownership is negatively
correlated with green innovation. In addition, although there is a certain correlation
between the main explanatory variables, the degree of correlation is not high, so we believe
that there is no serious multicollinearity between the explanatory variables.
Correlation coefficient matrix can only test the correlation between two explanatory
variables, but cannot test the multicollinearity of more than two explanatory variables.
Therefore, in order to make the regression results more robust, we adopt the method of
stepwise regression analysis. The specific results are shown in Table 5.
Table 5. Empirical test on the impact of green credit guidelines on corporate green innovation.
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Post






0.0130 *** 0.0124 *** 0.0125 ***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Top-ten Holders −0.0003 ** −0.0004 ***
(0.000) (0.000)










Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
N 22,829 22,829 22,829
R2 0.007 0.007 0.007
Note: the brackets are standard errors, ** and *** at the top right of data indicate significance at the levels of 5%,
and 1%, respectively.
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First, Column 1 of Table 5 presents the difference-in-difference regressions only with
basic explained variables such as group dummy variables, event dummy variables, interac-
tion variables, firm dummies, and year dummies. Column 2 gradually add variables repre-
senting the ownership structure such as top-ten holders, institutional investors, and state
ownership. Finally, two other control variables such as size and profitability are added in
Column 3.
Table 5 shows that green credit policy can promote green technology innovation of
enterprises. The coefficient on post is 0.0335, and it has passed the 1% significance level
test, which shows that after the introduction of green credit guidelines, green technology
innovation of enterprises has improved significantly. The coefficient on treat is insignificant,
which shows that there are no significant differences between the enterprises in heavy
pollution industry and those in non-heavy pollution industry. More importantly, the co-
efficients on the interaction term Post*Treat from column 1 to column 3 are significantly
positive, which indicates that green credit guidelines have a significant role in promoting
green technology innovation of enterprises. With other factors unchanged, the propor-
tion of green invention patents of enterprises in heavy pollution industries increased by
0.0124–0.0130, increased by 28.77–30.16%. These results verify the Porter hypothesis, that is,
appropriate environmental regulation can encourage enterprises to carry out technological
innovation. This is also consistent with several studies about China; for example, Zhao and
Sun [41] measured the local environmental regulation intensity from industrial wastes
and daily life wastes, used the panel data of China’s pollution intensive corporations,
and has proved the applicability of porter hypothesis in China. Li et al. [42] has constructed
a theoretical model and proved the effectivities of green loan and government subsidy
on promoting green innovation. Hong et al. [43] proved that the policy of mandatory
information disclosure can promote green technology innovation. However, this paper
measures the environmental regulation from the financial constraints.
In addition, the empirical results also show that the coefficients of top-ten holders
in column 2 and column 3 are −0.0003 and −0.0004, respectively, and they pass the
significance level tests of 5% and 1%, respectively. It shows that the higher the proportion
of top ten shareholders, the lower the level of green technology innovation. It supports the
hypothesis of “encroachment effect” of majority shareholders, that is, when the ownership
concentration increases, majority shareholders may be able to collude with managers to
appropriate minority shareholders. The coefficient on size is significantly positive. It means
that the larger the enterprise size is, the higher the level of green technology innovation. It is
consistent with the “Schumpeter hypothesis”, that is, the larger the size of the enterprise,
the more efficient the technological innovation. Large enterprises are more innovative than
small enterprises. In addition, the proportion of state ownership, institutional investors,
and profitability has not passed the significance test. It shows that the proportion of
state-owned shares, the proportion of institutional investors, and the improvement of
profitability cannot promote the green technology innovation of enterprises.
Then we test the parallel trend hypothesis, which is the precondition of the difference-
in-difference model. We mainly refer to the method of Bertrand and Mullainathan [44],
and take the year before the introduction of the green credit guidelines as the benchmark
year, and then add three variables Post2008, Post2009, and Post2010 for the pre-period and
six variables Post2013, Post2014, Post2015, Post2016, Post2017, and Post2018 for the post-period.
We then next interact these nine timing variables with treatment. The specific model is
as follows:





t × Treatment + βj Controlsj + ε (2)
Among them, 2011 is the reference year, and Postt is the time dummy variable.
When the time is in and after 2012, the value of Postt is 1; otherwise it is 0. Treatment is
a group dummy variable. When the enterprise is in the treatment group, the value is 1,
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 1682 11 of 21
otherwise the value is 0. We focus on the coefficient on the interaction Postt × Treatment,
which reflects the dynamic effect of green credit guidelines on green technology innova-
tion. In order to show the dynamic effect more intuitively, we plot the coefficient and the
confidence interval of 5% significance level, as shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Parallel trend test results.
Figure 1 shows that the parallel trend hypothesis is met. Specifically, before the
introduction of green credit guidelines, all coefficients of the interaction term are not
significant, while after the introduction, the coefficients of the interaction term in the
third, fifth, and sixth years are significantly positive. The former means that before the
introduction there is no significant difference of green technology innovation between
heavy polluting enterprises and non-heavy polluting enterprises. However, in the third to
sixth years after the introduction, the differences come into being (this can be understood
as lag effect, for it generally takes more than one year for patent application until its
acceptance). Heavy polluting enterprises produce significantly more green innovation
than non-heavy polluting ones. Therefore, we can identify these differences as the effect
of the introduction of green credit guidelines, which further prove the robust of above
research conclusion.
3. Impact Mechanism of Green Credit Guidelines on Green Technology Innovation
3.1. Model Design
As a kind of credit fund, green credit is bound to play an important role in enterprise
R&D. On the one hand, from the perspective of capital transmission, green credit has
the “green” attribute. It provides preferential credit interest rates and credit policies for
some e ergy-saving and environmental protection products with low pollution and low
consumption, correspondingly increases the credit cost of enterprises in heavy pollution
industries, reduces their debt level, and guides the capital flow of financial market from
enterprises in heavy pollution industries to enterprises in non-heavy pollution industries.
On the other hand, from the perspective of the characteristics, apart from general invest-
ment projects, technological innovation projects have the characteristics of high failure
rate, high risk, large capital investment, and long durance [45], often facing more serious
information asymmetry [46], so that financing constraints have become the “roadblock” of
enterprise innovation [47].
The previous benchmark regression results show that the green credit guidelines have
a promotion effect on the green technology innovation for heavy polluting enterprises.
However, the green credit guidelines may affect the level of debt financing and financing
ability of enterprises and affect the green technology innovation of enterprises. This paper
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discusses the indirect effect of green credit guidelines on green technology innovation from
two mechanisms. Among them, the first mechanism is the restrictive effect caused by the
reduction of debt financing level. That is to say, the green credit guidelines may reduce the
level of debt financing of enterprises, and then reduce the green technology innovation
of enterprises, which is called the “restriction mechanism”. The second mechanism is the
hindrance effect caused by the rise of financing constraints. That is to say, green credit
guidelines may increase the financing constraints of heavy polluting enterprises, and then
hinder their green technology innovation, which is called the “financing constraint” mecha-
nism. We mainly use the recursive regression equation of mediation effect model to identify
the existence of these two mechanisms [48]. The model is set as follows:
Greeninnovation = β0 + β1Post + β2Treatment firms + β3Post× Treatment firms + βjControlsj + ε (3)
Debt = β0 + β1Post + β2Treatment firms + θPost× Treatment firms + βjControlsj + ε (4)
Greenninovation = β0 + β1Post + β2Treatment firms + δ1Post× Treatment firms + λDebt + βjControlsj + ε (5)
According to the mediating effect model, the first step is to estimate Equation (3) and
test whether the promotion effect of green credit guidelines on technological innovation ex-
ists, if β1 is significantly positive, indicating that the introduction of green credit guidelines
does have a positive role in promoting green technology innovation, and the benchmark
regression model has been tested in the above; the second step is to regress Equation (4)
to examine the relationship between green credit guidelines and intermediary variables,
that is, the relationship between the introduction of green credit guidelines and the level
of financing constraints and debt financing, and the expected coefficient θ is positive and
negative, respectively. The third step is to estimate Equation (5), if β1, θ, and λ are all
significant, and δ1 in the two mechanisms is greater than and less than β1, respectively.
If neither θ or λ is significant, the Sobel test is needed to test the mediating effect.
3.2. Empirical Analysis
In order to test the mediating role of debt financing in green credit guidelines and
green technology innovation, this paper uses the mediating effect model for regression
analysis. Considering the differences between short-term liabilities and long-term liabilities,
interest bearing liabilities and non-interest bearing liabilities, three kinds of indicators are
used to measure the level of debt financing: the first indictor is the short-term debt financing
level, which is mainly expressed by the year-end balance of current liabilities; the second
indicator is the long-term debt financing level, which is mainly expressed by the sum
of the year-end balance of long-term loans, bonds payable, long-term accounts payable,
and special accounts payable. The third indicator is the level of financing liabilities, which is
also called interest bearing liabilities. It is mainly expressed by the sum of the year-end
short-term loans, long-term loans, non-current liabilities expiring within one year, and the
balance of bonds payable. The results are shown in Table 6.
Table 6 shows that green credit guidelines can reduce green technology innovation
through reducing the level of corporate debt financing. The coefficients of the interaction
term Post*Treat from column 1 to 3 are−0.04, −1.095, and−1.072, respectively, which have
passed the significance tests of 10%, 1%, and 1%, respectively. It shows that the introduc-
tion of green credit guidelines can significantly inhibit all kinds of debt financing levels
(including short-term debt financing level, long-term debt financing level, and financing
debt level). The coefficients of the interaction term Post*Treat from column 4 to 6 are 0.009,
0.011, and 0.011, respectively, and all pass the 1% significance test. The coefficients on ST
Debt in column 4 and LT Debt in column 5 are 0.004 and 0.00027 respectively, and they pass
the significance test of 1% and 10%, respectively. It shows that green credit guidelines can
reduce short-term debt financing and long-term debt financing, and thus reduce the green
technology innovation. In column 6, the coefficient on FI Debt did not pass the significance
test. Furthermore, the results of the Sobel test are not significant. Therefore, it can be
concluded that the green credit guidelines cannot reduce green technology innovation
by reducing the level of corporate financing liabilities. Specifically, with other factors un-
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changed, after the introduction of the green credit guidelines, the level of short-term debt
and long-term debt decreased by 0.04 and 1.095, respectively. It causes the green innovation
to decline about 0.00046 (0.04 × 0.004)~0.00077 (1.095 × 0.00027), which accounts for 3.68%
of the total effect (0.0125).
Table 6. An empirical test of green credit guidelines, financing level, and green technology innovation.
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ST Debt LT Debt FI Debt Innovation Innovation Innovation
Post
0.730 *** 2.134 *** 1.536 *** 0.009 *** 0.011 *** 0.011 ***
(0.015) (0.133) (0.106) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Treat
−0.241 *** 0.152 0.270 −0.004 −0.005 −0.005
(0.037) (0.316) (0.251) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Post*Treat
−0.040 * −1.095 *** −1.072 *** 0.013 *** 0.014 *** 0.014 ***











variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 21,497 21,488 21,498 23,080 23,071 23,081
R2 0.239 0.025 0.014 0.006 0.006 0.006
Note: the brackets are standard errors, * and *** at the top right of data indicate significance at the levels of 10%
and 1%, respectively; Columns (1)–(3) are regression results of formula (4), reflecting the effect of green credit
policy on intermediary variables such as ST Debt, LT Debt, and FI Debt; Columns (4)–(6) are regression results of
formula (5), reflecting the effect of green credit policy and intermediary variables on enterprise green technology
innovation. ST Debt, LT Debt, and FI Debt indicate the level of short-term debt, long-term debt, and financing
debt, respectively.
Lower debt financing does not necessarily lead to financing constraints. However,
R&D investment is vulnerable to financing constraints due to its high risk, large capital
investment, and long durance. Therefore, we also use the mediating effect model to
examine the existence of the “financing constraint” mechanism. The results are shown in
Table 7.
Table 7 shows that although green credit guidelines are able to improve the financing
constraints of enterprises, they cannot reduce the level of green technology innovation of
enterprises. The coefficient on the interaction term Post*Treat in column 1 is significantly
positive. It shows that the green credit guidelines improve the level of financing constraints
of enterprises. The coefficient on the interaction term Post*Treat in column 2 is significantly
positive. The coefficient on financial constraints (FC) is not significant. Furthermore,
the p value of the Sobel test is 0.7155, which indicates that it does not pass the mediating
effect test. The result shows that green credit guidelines cannot reduce the level of green
technology innovation by improving the financing constraints of enterprises.
Compared the results in Tables 6 and 7, it can be concluded that green credit guidelines
mainly affect the green technological innovation through the “restriction mechanism”
rather than “financing constraint” mechanism.
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−0.018 *** 0.012 ***
(0.007) (0.004)
Treat
−0.066 *** −0.006 **
(0.019) (0.010)
Post*Treat





Control variables Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
N 17,211 17,211
R2 0.0406 0.0053
Note: The brackets are standard errors, ** and *** at the top right of data indicate significance at the levels of 5%
and 1%, respectively; Column (1) is the regression result of Equation (4), reflecting the effect of green credit policy
on intermediary variables; Column (2) is the regression result of Equation (5), reflecting the effect of green credit
policy and intermediary variables on enterprise green technology innovation.
4. Further Discussion: Heterogeneity Analysis
4.1. Heterogeneity of Influence Degree
According to the nature of property rights and the firm size, we analyze the het-
erogeneous impact of green credit policy on green technology innovation. According to
the nature of property rights, the enterprises are divided into state-owned enterprises
(SOE) and non-state-owned enterprises (NSE). According to the firm size, the samples are
divided into three quartiles, the largest one-third of the samples are divided into large
firms, and the smallest one-third of the samples are divided into small firms. Using the
difference–difference model, the parameter estimation results are shown in Table 8.
Table 8. Heterogeneous impact of green credit guidelines on green innovation: sub-sample regression.
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SOE NSE Large Firms Small Firms
Post
0.0161 * 0.0333 *** 0.0465 *** 0.0352 ***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010)
Treat
−0.0069 0.0008 −0.0146 −0.0164 **
(0.010) (0.011) (0.017) (0.008)
Post*Treat
0.0213 *** 0.0036 0.0225 ** 0.0047
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
Control
variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9646 13,183 7610 7609
R2 0.0112 0.0065 0.0126 0.0064
Note: The brackets are standard errors, *, **, and *** at the top right of data indicate significance at the levels of
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Table 8 shows that green credit guidelines have a heterogeneous impact on green
innovation. Specifically, green credit guidelines can promote green technology innovation
in the sub-samples of state-owned enterprises and large-scale enterprises, but have no effect
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on state-owned enterprises and small-sized enterprises. In the sub-samples regression of
state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises, the coefficients on the interaction
term are 0.0213 and 0.0036, respectively. The former passed the significance test of 1%
level, while the latter does not pass the significance test. The results show that green
credit guidelines could only affect green innovation in state-owned enterprises rather than
non-state-owned enterprises. In the sub-samples regression of large enterprises and small
enterprises, the coefficients on the interaction term are 0.0225 and 0.0047, respectively.
The former passed the significance test of 1% level, while the latter did not pass the
significance test. Therefore, we can believe that green credit guidelines could only affect
green innovation in large enterprises rather than small enterprises.
Therefore, green credit guidelines have a heterogeneous impact on enterprises with
different attributes. The promotion effects are mainly reflected in state-owned enterprises
and large-scale enterprises. The reason may be that state-owned enterprises and large enter-
prises are more sensitive to the government policy, which makes them respond faster and
greater once the policy is issued. At the same time, according to the Schumpeter hypothesis,
innovative activities often take high fixed cost and low marginal cost. Large enterprises
have the advantages of scale economy, which can dilute the fixed cost, so they are willing
to invest more in innovative activities.
4.2. Heterogeneity of Influence Mechanism
Furthermore, as mentioned above, since the heterogeneity of influence degree has
been confirmed, is there heterogeneity of influence mechanism? In order to explore the het-
erogeneity of influence mechanism, we firstly divide samples into state-owned enterprises
and non-state-owned enterprises, large-size enterprises and small enterprises. Then we
use the mediating effect model to analyze the mechanism in sub-samples. The results are
shown in Table 9.
Table 9 shows that the influence mechanism on enterprises with different property
rights is heterogeneous. Panel A of Table 9 shows that the coefficients on the interaction
term Post*Treat in column 2 and column 3 are both significantly negative, while the
coefficients on the interaction term in column 1 are insignificant. These results indicate
that green credit guidelines can reduce the level of long-term debt and financing debt of
state-owned enterprises rather than the level of short-term debt. The coefficients on the
interaction term from column 4 to column 6 are all significantly positive. The coefficients
on ST Debt in column 4 are significantly positive. The coefficients on FI Debt in column 6
is significantly positive. However, the coefficient on LT Debt in column 5 is insignificant.
Furthermore, the mediating effect test shows that neither the mechanism of ST Debt or LT
Debt as the mediators exist. Therefore, these results indicate that green credit guidelines
can reduce green innovation of state-owned enterprises mainly by reducing the level of
financing liabilities of state-owned enterprises, rather than reducing the level of short-term
debt financing and long-term debt financing.
Panel B of Table 9 shows that all the coefficients on the interaction term Post*Treat from
column 1 to column 3 are significantly negative. However, none of the coefficients on ST
Debt in column 4, LT Debt in column 5, or FI Debt in column 6 are significant. These results
indicate that although green credit guidelines can reduce the level of short-term debt,
long-term debt, and financing debt, they cannot thus reduce green innovation.
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Table 9. Analysis on the influence mechanism in state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises.
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ST Debt LT Debt FI Debt Innovation Innovation Innovation
Panel A: The Mechanism on State-Owned Enterprises
Post*Treat
−0.012 −1.040 *** −0.720 *** 0.022 *** 0.022 *** 0.022 ***










Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9646 9646 9646 9646 9646 9646
R2 0.306 0.022 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
Panel B: The Mechanism on Non-State-Owned Enterprises
Post*Treat
−0.077 ** −1.090 *** −1.450 *** 0.005 0.005 0.005










Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 13,183 13,183 13,183 13,183 13,183 13,183
R2 0.274 0.039 0.039 0.005 0.005 0.005
Note: The brackets are standard errors, *, **, and *** at the top right of data indicate significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Therefore, whether state-owned enterprises or non-state-owned enterprises, the first
action mechanism is established, namely, green credit guidelines will reduce the level of
debt financing in both state-owned enterprises or non-state-owned enterprises. The differ-
ences are: green credit guidelines can reduce the level of long-term debt and financing debt
in state-owned enterprises, while they can reduce all debts in non-state-owned enterprises
including short-term debt, long-term debt financing, and financing debt. This may be due
to the fact that state-owned enterprises have the government as the backstage guarantee.
Therefore, the short-term debt financing such as accounts payable and employee compen-
sation payable are not affected, but the interest bearing debt financing such as short-term
loans, long-term loans, bonds payable, and the long-term debt level such as long-term
accounts payable have decreased significantly, thus affecting the green technological inno-
vation of enterprises. However, the second step of the influence mechanism is established
only in the state-owned enterprises, whose green innovation is affected by green credit
guidelines through debt financing. Specifically, green credit guidelines can inhibit green
technology innovation by reducing the financing debt level of large enterprises.
This may be due to the fact that large enterprises have enough assets that can be used
as collateral, so the interest bearing debt financing such as short-term loans, long-term loans,
bonds payable, and the long-term debt level such as long-term accounts payable will not be
affected. However, green credit does have some effect on the development of enterprises,
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so their commercial credit level such as accounts payable and employee compensation
payable will be reduced, and thus will affect their green technology innovation.
Furthermore, this paper distinguishes enterprises with different sizes and examines
their heterogeneous influence mechanism. The results are shown in Table 10.
Table 10. Analysis on the influence mechanism in large enterprises and small enterprises.
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ST Debt LT Debt FI Debt Innovation Innovation Innovation
Panel A: The Influence Mechanism on Large Enterprises
Post*Treat
−0.053 * −0.344 −0.185 0.024 *** 0.024 *** 0.024 ***










Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7610 7610 7610 7610 7610 7610
R2 0.334 0.017 0.035 0.008 0.007 0.007
Panel B: The Influence Mechanism on Small Enterprises
Post*Treat
−0.001 −1.415 *** −1.062 *** 0.011 0.011 0.011










Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7609 7609 7609 7609 7609 7609
R2 0.076 0.007 0.012 0.006 0.006 0.006
Note: The brackets are standard errors, *, **, and *** at the top right of data indicate significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
For the sake of brevity, the coefficients of post and treat are omitted in the table. Panel A and Panel B are the results of mechanism analysis
of large enterprises and small enterprises, respectively, in which (1)–(3) are the first step of influence mechanism, that is, the effect of green
credit policy on debt financing level, and (4)–(6) are the second step of influence mechanism, that is, the effect of green credit policy and
debt financing level on green technology innovation.
Table 10 shows that the influence mechanism on enterprises with different sizes is
heterogeneous. Panel A of Table 10 shows that the coefficient on the interaction term
Post*Treat in column 1 is significantly negative, while neither the coefficient on the interac-
tion term in column 2 or column 3 is significant. These results indicate that green credit
guidelines can only reduce the level of short-term debt in large enterprises rather than
the level of long-term debt and financing debt. The coefficients on the interaction term
from column 4 to column 6 are all significantly positive. The coefficients on ST Debt in
column 4 are significantly positive. Neither the coefficient on LT Debt in column 5 nor FI
Debt in column 6 is significant. The results indicate that the higher the short-term debt
financing level of large enterprises, the more green technology innovation can be promoted,
while the long-term debt financing level and financing debt level have no significant effect.
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Panel B of Table 10 shows that both the coefficients on the interaction term Post*Treat
on column 2 and column 3 are significantly negative, while the coefficient on the interaction
term in column 1 is insignificant. These results show that green credit guidelines can
significantly reduce the level of long-term debt level and financing debt in small enterprises,
but cannot reduce the level of short-term debt. However, none of the coefficients on
interaction term from column 4 to column 6 are significant. Neither the coefficient on LT
Debt in column 5 nor FI Debt in column 6 is significant. Although the coefficient on ST
Debt is significant positive, the p value of Sobel test is 0.343, which denies the existence of
mediating effect. These results indicate that although green credit guidelines can reduce
the level of long-term debt and financing debt, they cannot thus reduce green innovation.
Therefore, whether large enterprises or small enterprises, the first step of influence
mechanism is established. Green credit guidelines will reduce their debt financing level.
Large enterprises exhibit a decrease in short-term debt level, while small enterprises
exhibit a decrease in long-term debt level and financing debt level. The second step of
the influence mechanism is only established in large enterprises, whose green innovation
is affected by green credit guidelines through debt financing. Specifically, green credit
guidelines can inhibit green technology innovation by reducing the short-term debt level
of large enterprises. This may be due to the fact that large enterprises have enough assets
that can be used as collateral, so the interest bearing debt financing such as short-term
loans, long-term loans, bonds payable, and the long-term debt level such as long-term
accounts payable will not be affected. However, green credit does have some effect on
the development of enterprises, so their commercial credit level such as accounts payable
and employee compensation payable will be reduced and thus will affect their green
technology innovation.
5. Limitations of the Study
This study has several limitations. First, although we argue that green credit guidelines
can promote enterprise green technology innovation, and that the possible mechanism
may be the policy incentive of green credit guidelines, there is no corresponding empirical
test for this policy incentive mechanism. Second, due to lack of the corresponding data,
we are unable to make a comparative analysis between one group of enterprises that have
credit and another group of enterprises that do not have credit. We believe that if we finish
these two tasks, the results will be more substantial and interesting. Thirdly, it is necessary
to consider firm’s micro behavior from circular economy strategies. Especially, with the
advent of the digital economy era, digital technologies are essential enables of the circular
economy [49,50], and the effect of green credit guidelines on green technology innovation
may show other heterogeneity characteristics. All of these limitations are the directions of
our further study.
6. Conclusions
Based on the panel data of China’s A-share non-financial listed companies from 2007
to 2018, this paper constructs a difference-in-difference model to study the impact of green
credit guidelines on corporate green technology innovation.
First of all, green credit guidelines have a significant role in promoting green tech-
nology innovation. The weak Porter hypothesis is still controversial about the effect of
environmental regulation on corporate technological innovation. This study uses the
samples of Chinese listed companies to empirically test that green credit guidelines can
promote corporate green technological innovation. This positive effect may be due to the
incentive effect of green credit guidelines, which is manifested in three aspects: (1) Green
credit policy will attract public attention to green products, which makes enterprises have
to face public supervision, attach importance to their own social responsibility, and con-
sciously improve the level of green technology innovation. (2) Under the green credit
policy, in order to obtain more credit support or better loan interest rate, enterprises often
improve environmental governance technology, promote cleaner production, or increase
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environmental governance to control environmental risks. (3) Green credit policy can
effectively reduce the uncertainty and risk in the process of R&D investment.
Secondly, the mechanism of green credit on corporate green technology innovation is
identified. Green credit guidelines mainly limited green technology innovation through
reducing debt financing, rather than through financing constraints. Specifically, green credit
guidelines inhibit green technology innovation by reducing the short-term debt and long-
term debt financing level.
Finally, the impact of green credit guidelines on green technology innovation is het-
erogeneous. The heterogeneity of green credit guidelines on corporate green technology
innovation is manifested in the degree and mechanism of influence. On the one hand,
the impact degree on different types of enterprises is heterogeneous. In the state-owned
enterprises and large enterprises, green credit guidelines has a significant role in pro-
moting green technology innovation, but in the non-state-owned enterprises and small
enterprises, green credit guidelines has no significant impact on green technology inno-
vation. On the other hand, the impact mechanism on different types of enterprises is
heterogeneous. In large enterprises, green credit guidelines inhibit green technology inno-
vation by reducing the level of short-term debt financing. In the state-owned enterprises,
green credit guidelines can inhibit green technology innovation by reducing the level of
financing liabilities.
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0.1182 *** 0.1181 *** 0.1180 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Post






0.2418 ** 0.2433 ** 0.2521 **
(0.109) (0.109) (0.110)















Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes
N 22,823 22,823 22,823
R2 0.429 0.430 0.430
Note: the brackets are standard errors, *, **, and *** at the top right of data indicate significance at the levels of
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The dependent variable is the number of green patents, and the independent
variable Patent measures the number of patents.
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